The incomplete moment generating function (IMGF) has paramount relevance in communication theory, since it appears in a plethora of scenarios when analyzing the performance of communication systems. We here present a general method for calculating the IMGF of an arbitrary fading distribution. Then, we provide exact closed-form expressions for the IMGF of the very general κ-µ shadowed fading model, which includes the popular κ-µ, η-µ, Rician shadowed and other classical models as particular cases. We illustrate the practical applicability of this result by analyzing the physical layer security of wireless communication systems in the presence of an eavesdropper, when the fading on the desired link can be modeled by any of the aforementioned distributions.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE moment generating function (MGF) has played a pivotal role in communication theory for decades, as a tool for evaluating the performance of communication systems in very different scenarios [1] [2] [3] [4] . The MGF of the signal-tonoise ratio (SNR) γ, defined as the Laplace transform of the Probability Density Function (PDF) of γ, is well-known for most popular fading distributions [5] [6] [7] and hence enables for a simple characterization of the performance metrics of interest in closed-form.
A more general function extensively used in communication theory is the so-called incomplete MGF (IMGF), or truncated MGF. This function has an additional degree of freedom by allowing the lower (or equivalently, upper) limit of the integral in the Laplace transform, say ζ, to be greater than zero (or equivalently, lower than ∞), and also appears when characterizing the performance in a number of scenarios of interest: symbol and bit error rate calculation with multiantenna reception [8, 9] , capacity analysis in fading channels [2] , outage probability analysis in cellular systems [10, 11] , adaptive scheduling techniques [12] , cognitive relay networks [13] or physical layer security [14] . Despite its usefulness, to the best of our knowledge the expressions of the IMGF are largely unknown for fading distributions other than the classical ones: Rayleigh, Rice, Nakagami-m and Hoyt. In fact, as pointed out in [2] , "a general theory to compute . .
. this function in closed-form does not yet exist."
Thence, there is a twofold motivation for this paper from a purely communication-theoretic perspective: first, we present a systematic method for deriving the IMGF of the SNR for an arbitrary distribution. Then, we derive a closed-form expression for the IMGF of the κ-µ shadowed distribution [7, 15] , which includes popular fading distributions such as κ-µ, η-µ [16, 17] or Rician-shadowed [18] as particular cases, and for all of which the IMGF had not been previously reported.
In order to illustrate its applicability in a practical scenario, we focus on a physical-layer security set-up on which two legitimate peers (Alice and Bob) wish to communicate in the presence of an external eavesdropper (Eve). The characterization of the maximum rate at which a secure communication can be attained, i.e. the secrecy capacity C S , is a classical problem [19, 20] in communication theory. Remarkably, the research on physical-layer security of communication systems operating in the presence of fading has been boosted in the last years ever since the original works in [21, 22] . The fact that Eve and Bob observe independent fading realizations adds an additional layer of security to communication compared to the conventional set-up for the Gaussian wiretap channel [20] . Hence, a secure communication is feasible even when the average SNR at Bob is lower than the average SNR at Eve.
In the literature, there is a great interest on understanding how the consideration of more sophisticated fading models than Rayleigh may impact the secrecy performance attending to different metrics: the outage probability of secrecy capacity (OPSC), the probability of strictly-positive secrecy capacity (SPSC) or the average secrecy capacity (ASC). Specifically, fading models such as Nakagami-m [23] , Rician [24] , Weibull [25] , two-wave with diffuse power [26] , Nakagami-q [27] or κ-µ [28] have been considered. However, the statistical characterization of the OPSC in a tractable form is often unfeasible due to the involved mathematical derivations. Thus, approximations are usually required for evaluating the OPSC [26, 28] , being only possible the calculation of the SPSC in closed-form [24, 25, 28] .
Very recent works have proposed novel approaches to deriving the secrecy performance metrics in a general way: in [29] , a duality between the OPSC and the outage probability analysis in the presence of interference and background noise was presented, which greatly simplifies the analysis of the OPSC calculation for an arbitrary choice of fading distributions for the desired and eavesdropper links. In [30] , a unified MGF approach to the analysis of physical-layer security in wireless systems was introduced, allowing for a numerical evaluation of the secrecy performance metrics for arbitrary fading distributions.
Hence, the practical application presented in this paper can be resorted as an IMGF-approach to the physical-layer security analysis of wireless communication systems, on which the legitimate link can follow any arbitrary distribution. As we will later see, the OPSC can be evaluated directly by specializing the IMGF of the SNR at Bob at some specific values. Thus, the OPSC (and hence the SPSC as an special case) can be evaluated in closed-form provided that such IMGF is given in closed-form. This is exemplified for the very general case of the κ-µ shadowed distribution.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in Section II, the main mathematical contributions of this paper are presented, within the most relevant is a general way to deriving the IMGF of an arbitrary fading distribution. Closed-form expressions for the IMGF of the κ-µ shadowed distribution are also given, as well as for all the special cases included therein (κ-µ, η-µ and Rician shadowed). Then, in Section III this mathematical results are used to present an IMGF-based approach to the physical-layer security analysis in wireless systems. Numerical results are given in Section IV, whereas the main conclusions are outlined in Section V.
II. MATHEMATICAL RESULTS

Definition 1 (Lower IMGF):
Let X be a non-negative random variable and ζ a non-negative real number, the lower IMGF of X is defined as
Definition 2 (Upper IMGF): Let X be a non-negative random variable and ζ a non-negative real number, the upper IMGF of X is defined as
Obviously, the MGF of X is obtained from these IMGFs as
. Both incomplete IMGFs are easily related through the following equation
In the following lemma, we present a general expression for the IMGF of an arbitrarily distributed non-negative random variable. Lemma 1: Let X be a non-negative random variable with MGF M γ (s). Its lower IMGFs can be computed by the inverse Laplace transform of the scaled-shifted MGF, i.e.
where L {h (z) ; z, p} ∞ 0 e −pz h (z) dz represents the Laplace transform from the z-domain to the p-domain, and L −1 {H (z) ; p, z} the inverse Laplace transform from the p-domain to the z-domain.
Proof: Let us consider the upper IMGF in eq. (1) as a function of the upper integration limit, i.e.
The Laplace transform of Λ(z) in the p-domain can be expressed as
where both the definite integral property and the modulation property of the Laplace transform have been applied in order to complete the proof. This lemma provides a general way of computing the IMGF in terms of the conventional MGF. Interestingly, (4) involves an inverse Laplace transform of a shifted version of the MGF, scaled by the Laplace domain variable p. Thus, it is expectable that the IMGF has a functional form similar to the CDF, since the CDF arises as a particular case of the lower IMGF when evaluated in s = 0 i.e.
As consequences of lemma 1, the IMGF of any nonnegative RV can be obtained in a very general form by an inverse Laplace transform operation over the MGF. As we will now show, this Laplace transform can be computed in closed-form for a number of fading distributions of interest. In the following Corollaries (and summarized in Table I ), we derive closed-form expressions for the IMGF of the κ-µ shadowed distribution and the special cases included therein, namely the Rician shadowed, κ-µ and η-µ distributions. All these expressions are new in the literature to the best of our knowledge.
Corollary 1:
Let γ be a κ-µ shadowed random variable with E {γ} =γ, and non-negative real shape parameters κ, µ and m, i.e, γ ∼ S κµm (γ; κ, µ, m)
1 [7] . Then, its lower IMGF is given in the first entry of Table I , where Φ 2 (·) is the bivariate confluent hypergeometric function defined in [31, eq. 9.261.2] .
Proof: For the sake of clarity let us write the MGF of the κ-µ shadowed distribution as follows
In order to apply Lemma 1, the scaled-shifted MGF of γ is first expressed as follows
(9) To perform the inverse Laplace transform the following pair can be considered [32, pp. 290 ]
(10) Joining (9), (10) and Lemma 1 the proof is completed.
It must be noted that the IMGF here obtained has the same functional form as the CDF given in [7, eq. 6] ; thus, evaluating the IMGF has the same complexity as evaluating the CDF.
Corollary 2:
Let γ be a Rician shadowed random variable with E {γ} =γ, and non-negative real shape parameters K and m, i.e, γ ∼ S Km (γ; K, m) [18] . Then, its lower IMGF is given in the second entry of Table I .
Proof: Specializing the results for the κ-µ shadowed distribution for µ = 1, the IMGF for the Rician-shadowed case is obtained with K = κ.
Again, the IMGF of the Rician Shadowed distribution has the same functional form as its CDF [33] . We must note that for the case of m ∈ Z, we have that Φ 2 (1 − m, m; 2; ·, ·) function reduces to a finite sum of Laguerre polynomials [33, eq. 4] ; similarly, for m being a positive half integer, then Φ 2 (1 − m, m; 2; ·, ·) function reduces to a finite sum of Kummer hypergeometric functions, modified Bessel functions and Marcum-Q functions [33, eq. 7] .
Corollary 3: Let γ be a κ-µ random variable with E {γ} =γ and non-negative real shape parameters κ and µ, i.e, γ ∼ S κµ (γ; κ, µ) [16] . Then, its lower IMGF is given in the third entry of Table I , where Q µ is the generalized Marcum Q function of µ-th order [5] .
Proof: Using the MGF of a κ-µ distributed RV γ in [6] , and according to Lemma 1, the lower IMGF can be expressed as
After some algebra, the terms in (11) can be conveniently rearranged so the inverse Laplace transform has the following form:
This inverse Laplace transform can be calculated in terms of the bivariate confluent hypergeometric function Φ 3 (·) defined in [31, eq. 9.261.3] by using the transform pair in [34, 4.24.9] . This yields
Finally, we make use of the existing connection between the Φ 3 (1, µ + 1; a; b) function and the generalized Marcum Q-function, which holds for µ ∈ R. Adapting [35, eq. 34 ] to the specific case here addressed, we have
Combining this equation with (13) yields the final expression given in the third entry of Table I . This completes the proof.
Note that the IMGF is given in terms of the well-known Marcum Q-function, just like the CDF of the κ-µ distribution originally derived by Yacoub [16] .
Corollary 4:
Let γ be a η-µ random variable with E {γ} =γ and non-negative real shape parameters η and µ, i.e, γ ∼ S ηµ (γ; η, µ) [16] . Then, its lower IMGF is given in the fourth entry of Table I .
Proof: Leveraging the recent connection between the κ-µ shadowed distribution and the η-µ distribution [17] , the IMGF of the η-µ power envelope in format 1 is obtained by setting the parameters of the κ-µ shadowed distribution to µ = 2µ, κ = 1−η 2η and m = µ. This expression is coincident with the one obtained in [35] , and also has the same complexity as the original CDF for the η-µ distribution derived in [36] .
III. APPLICATION: PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
A. Single-antenna scenario
Aided by the previous mathematical results, we will now show how the IMGF can be used to directly analyze the performance in wireless scenarios. Specifically, we aim to determine the physical layer security of a wireless link between two legitimate peers (Alice and Bob) in the presence of an external eavesdropper (Eve) [21, 22] . We first consider that Bob, Eve and Alice are equipped with single-antenna devices; the inclusion of multiple antennas at Bob or Eve will be later discussed in this Section. Depending on the characteristics of the propagation environment, random fluctuations affecting the desired and wiretap links need to be modeled with a specific distribution. 
The performance in this scenario can be characterized by the secrecy capacity C S , defined as
where γ b and γ e are the instantaneous SNRs at Bob and Eve, respectively, and C b and C e denote the capacities of the communication links between Alice and Bob, and between Alice and Eve, respectively. In many cases, Eve's channel state information (CSI) is not available at Alice and hence perfect secrecy is not possible. This may be the case on which Eve is a passive eavesdropper, and hence Alice has no way to have access to Eve's CSI. Conversely, perfect knowledge of Bob's CSI by Alice can be assumed. Thus, Alice selects a constant secrecy rate R S for transmission; in this situation, the outage probability of the secrecy capacity (OPSC) gives the probability that communication at a certain secrecy rate R S > 0 cannot be securely attained. This metric is computed as follows
The probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity can be obtained as a particular case of (16) by setting R S = 0. Finally, another secrecy performance metric of interest is the ǫ-outage secrecy capacity C ǫ . This is defined as the largest secrecy rate R s for which the OPSC satisfies (P Rs ≤ ǫ), with 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1. For a certain ǫ, this metric is computed as
In some scenarios, Eve may only have access to signals arriving from NLOS paths [37, 38] . Under this premise, we can assume that the eavesdropper link can be modeled by the Rayleigh distribution. This leads γ e to be exponentially distributed with average SNRγ e , i.e. γ e ∼ Exp(γ e ). With this only restriction, the OPSC in this scenario assuming an arbitrary fading distribution for the legitimate link between Alice and Bob can be computed using the following Lemma:
Lemma 2: Let us consider the communication between two legitimate peers A and B in the presence of an external eavesdropper E. Let γ b and γ e be the instantaneous SNRs at B and E, respectively, andγ b andγ e the average SNRs at B and E, respectively. If γ e ∼ Exp(γ e ), then the OPSC can be expressed in terms of the IMGF of γ b as
where F γ b (·) is the CDF of γ b , for any finite rate R S ≥ 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note that this Lemma provides a systematic way to derive the OPSC for any arbitrary fading distribution in the legitimate link, provided that the IMGF of the SNR at Bob is known. Thence, we can use the results in Table I combined with (3) to derive analytical expressions for the secrecy performance in those scenarios on which the fading at the desired link can be modeled by the general κ-µ shadowed distribution, or any of the particular cases included therein. We must also note the OPSC forγ b ≫γ e does not depend on the distribution of γ e , but only on the distribution of γ b and the average SNR at Eveγ e [27] . Thus, the consideration of Rayleigh fading for the eavesdropper link has a negligible effect in practice, while greatly simplifying the analysis.
B. Extension to the multi-antenna scenario
In the previous analysis, we have explicitly assumed that all the agents in the system are equipped with single-antenna devices. We here show that the extension for the case on which Eve and Bob are multi-antenna devices can be straightforwardly carried out.
First, note that in the derivation carried out in Appendix A in order to prove Lemma 2, there is neither any restriction related to the number of antennas used by Bob, nor related to the combining strategy carried out. Hence, Lemma 2 can be applied as is for a multi-antenna configuration at Bob. In this case, the only requirement to derive the OPSC is to determine the IMGF of the SNR after combining. For instance, if maximal ratio combining (MRC) is used by Bob we have that
where N B is the number of receive antennas at Bob, γ bi denote the per-branch instantaneous SNRs, and independence between receive branches has been considered. When assuming multiple antennas at Eve with i.i.d. branches under Rayleigh fading, and considering that Eve performs MRC reception in order to maximize the receive SNR, the assumption of γ e being exponentially distributed no longer holds. In this case, γ e = NE i=1 γ ei is now chi-squared distributed and its CDF is now given by
Plugging (20) in (26) yields
Using the binomial expansion, and defining α = 2 RS − 1,
RSγ e , the integral term I can be reexpressed as
where the general derivative property in the transform domain was used, in order to identify the k th derivative of the IMGF.
Finally, using (22) in (21) and (16) yields
Thus, in order to incorporate multiple antennas at Eve, the k th -order derivative of the IMGF (also referred to as incomplete generalized MGF [11] ) needs to be calculated. However, these derivatives can be computed in closed-form, provided that the IMGF has a closed-form expression.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we provide numerical results for the outage probability of the secrecy capacity under different fading scenarios. We assume that Bob and Eve are only equipped with one antenna. The effect of system parameters on the ǫ-outage secrecy capacity is also investigated. All the results shown here have been analytically obtained by the direct evaluation of the expressions developed in this paper: Additionally, Monte Carlo simulations have been performed to validate the derived expressions, and are also presented in all figures, showing an excellent agreement with the analytical results. Details on how to compute the confluent bivariate function Φ 2 are given in [7, App. E].
In Figs. 1-5 , the OPSC is represented considering different fading models as a function of the average SNR at Bobγ b , for different sets of values of the fading parameters. We assume in these figures that the normalized rate threshold value used to declare an outage is R S = 0.1, and an average SNR at Evē γ e = 15 dB.
Figs. 1 and 2, show results for the κ-µ shadowed fading considering, respectively, small (κ = 1.5) and large (κ = 10) line-of sight (LOS) components in the received wave clusters for different values of the µ parameter and also considering light (m = 12) or heavy (m = 0.5) shadowing for the LOS components. As expected, as the fading parameter µ increases, the diversity gain increases too, resulting in a higher slope of the curves in the high SNR regime, and with diminishing returns as µ increases. Note that µ represents the number of received wave clusters when it takes an integer value. It can also be observed that the performance is always better when the LOS components are lightly shadowed, and this improvement is much more noticeable for large LOS components.
The impact of shadowed LOS components on performance can be observed in Fig. 3 , where the outage probability of the secrecy capacity under Rician shadowed fading is presented for different values of the m and K parameters. It can be observed that it is more beneficial for the performance to have small LOS components (K = 1.5) if they are affected by heavy shadowing. Conversely, if the shadowing is mild, large LOS components always yield a lower outage probability. This appreciation can be confirmed by observing the results in Fig.  4 , which depicts the outage probability under κ-µ fading, i.e., when the LOS components do not experience any shadowing. Fig. 5 presents results for the η-µ fading, i.e.. in a NLOS scenario on which the in-phase and quadrature components of the scattered waves are not necessarily equally distributed. We consider format 1 of this distribution, for which η represents the scattered-wave power ratio between the in-phase and quadrature components of each cluster of multipath, and the number of multipath clusters, when µ is a semi-integer, is represented by 2µ . It can be observed that, when the in-phase and quadrature components are highly imbalanced (η = 0.04), the performance is poorer. On the other hand, increasing the number of multipath clusters have always a beneficial impact on performance, as the instantaneous received signal power is smoothed. Fig. 6 shows the normalized ǫ-outage secrecy capacity C ǫ under κ-µ shadowed fading as a function ofγ b , where the capacity normalization has been computed with respect to the capacity of an AWGN channel with SNR equal toγ b . We have assumed m = 2 and an average SNR at Eve ofγ e = −10 dB. The corresponding results for η-µ fading are presented in Fig.  7 , also forγ e = −10 dB. In both figures it can be observed that when the outage probability is set to a high value (ǫ = 0.8), better channel conditions (i.e. µ = 6, κ = 10 for κ-µ shadowed fading and µ = 4, η = 0.9 for η-µ fading) yield a lower ǫ-outage capacity. Conversely, better channel conditions results in a higher capacity for lower values of ǫ. Further insight can be obtained from Fig. 8 , where it is shown the normalized ǫ-outage secrecy capacity C ǫ under κ-µ fading as a function of the outage probability ǫ and for different average SNRs at Eve, assuming an average SNR of 10 dB at the desired link. We observe that higher outage probability ǫ leads to higher C ǫ , having an important influence the average SNR of the eavesdropper's channel. It can also be observed that, as the channel conditions improve, the normalized ǫ-outage secrecy capacity tends to one for all values of the outage probability for low values ofγ e . Note that wireless communication over fading channels does not require necessarily the average SNR of the channel between Alice and Bob to be greater than the average SNR of the channel between Alice and Eve, since there is certain probability that the instantaneous SNR of the main channel being higher than the instantaneous SNR of the eavesdropper's channel (γ b > γ e ) even whenγ b <γ e . In fact, there is a trade off between the outage probability of the secrecy capacity Pr {C S ≤ R S } and the ǫ-outage secrecy capacity C ǫ , where a higher C ǫ corresponds to a higher outage probability ǫ, and viceversa. For that reason, results in Figs. 6, 7 and 8 show that the normalized outage secrecy capacity may have nonzero values even whenγ b ≤γ e (for high values of ǫ).
V. CONCLUSIONS
A fundamental connection between the incomplete MGF of a positive random variable and its complete MGF has been presented. The main takeaway is that the IMGF is expected to have a similar functional form as the CDF, and hence its evaluation should not require any additional complexuty. Using this novel connection, closed-form expressions for the IMGF of the κ-µ shadowed distribution (and all the special cases included therein) have been derived for the first time in the literature. This has enabled us to introduce a new framework for the analysis of the physical layer security in scenarios on which the desired link is affected by any arbitrary fading distribution, being exemplified for the very general case of the κ-µ shadowed fading model. We hope that the results in this paper may faciltate the performance evaluation for all the situations on which the IMGF makes appearances [2, [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] .
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 2
From the definition of OPSC in (16) , the probability of achieving a successful secure communication is given by Pr {C S > R S } = Pr γ e < 1 2 RS (1 + γ b ) − 1 .
Note that γ e only takes non-negative values; hence, for this condition to occur in (24) , then the inequality γ b ≥ 2 RS − 1 must be satisfied, i.e.
Pr γ e < 1 2 RS (1 + γ b ) − 1|γ b < 2 RS − 1 = 0.
Therefore we can write 
where F X (·) and f X (·) are the CDF and PDF of the random variable X, respectively. Since γ e ∼ Exp(γ e ), we have
Therefore, after some manipulation we can write
By noticing that the integral expression in (28) has the form of the upper incomplete MGF of a random variable γ b as in (2) , from (16) and (28) the OPSC will finally be given by P RS = F γ b 2 Rs − 1 + e 
This completes the proof.
